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Analysis of Induced Institutional Innovation
Alternatives for Provision of Local Government Services
Abstract
An induced innovations framework was used to develop and test a
model of factors affecting county government's decisions to adopt
alternative service delivery methods. Size measures of population and
tax base, fiscal measures of tax revenues, the share of tax base in
•agriculture and access to human capital were significantly
related to county use of innovations.
Analysis'of Induced Instltutlohal iTmovation
Alternatives for Provision of Local Government Services
Many local government units in rural-areas of the nation "are being
confronted with fiscal stress from several 'sources. These sources include
structural change in the local economic base,.demographic shifts, reduced
intergovernmental^revenues-and declining property values. The range of
possible choices appear -to encon^ass -'some combination of economic
development efforts;" raising effective^'tax rates, -reducing services, or
restructuring institution's to provide services more efficiently.
Institutional restructuring or innovation refers to internal
restructuring; functional consolidation,'"geographical consolidation,
and/or privatization. It is often presumed that community choice
regarding institutional innovation-is related 'to a.variety .of economic and
social factors.'
In this-study, •we develop a theoretical'model that relates selected
economic- and social ^factors to institutional innovations. Second, we
develop an empirical model to test the existence of. these h3^qthesized
relationships using observed institutional, innovations. Finally, we
outline the conclusions and implications resulting from the en^irical
analyses' of community choice.^ ' " ,
Induced •Innovations .
Previous work-by Deaton• (1983) applied .the.-induced institutional,
innovatibns-i'framework approach of Ruttan-Hayami to .analyze the local-
response to a shift in intergovernmental revenue .for the.case.of public
"education (Ruttan). The'framework'developed by Ruttan-Hayami provides
a set of axioms under which institutional innovations are likely to
occur:
a) The benefits derived from new income streams generated by
institutional innovations needs to exceed the costs of establishing and
using new institutional arrangements.
b) The rate of change in the supply of institutional innovations
will be determined.by the marginal costs of mobilizing the economic and
political resources needed to design new institutions.
c) There needs to be sufficient returns in terms of greater
prestige or increased political support that accrues to the "political
entrepreneur" for the entrepreneur to introduce institutional
innovations.
The cost reducing factors can be interpreted as inducing both
technical and institutional innovations by causing changes in factor
prices. These axioms provide a criteria to evaluate the outcome of
efforts to introduce institutional changes into the provision of
providing local government services.
We can apply this framework to the behavior of local governments in
response to declines in economic base and fiscal stress. In Figure 1,
the isoquant represents the quantity of public goods that can be
produced -by a combination of tax based spending and by alternative
nontax arrangements such as the privatization of certain services,
contracting, or consolidation. Line BB represents and exchange ratio
between tax revenues and nontax means of providing the public goods. An
optimal equilibrium point b occurs under a fiscal relationship prior to
changes in the fiscal or economic environment.
The loss of federal revenue 'shWing and tax base declines raise the
relative cost^f using local taxes. This revenue.loss results in a
change in the tax-nontax exchange ratio CC. The local .response to thxs
change in tax revenues is expected to be either areduction in- the. •
quantity of public services offered by local government, or amovement
toward nontax means of providing these public services.- Within the
induced institutional innovations framework', a shift -in the exchange
ratio is expected to induce political entrepreneurs to develop new
approaches or institutional arrangements to provide•local public-
services as represented by isoquant i^.
fU"r» t.
Theoretical Framework
In the public finance literature, one of the primary roles of local
government is the provision of public goods and service. The mix is
dependent on local values and resources. The public sector organizes to
provide public goods by combining private and public resources. The
public resources are represented by purchased services financed by taxes.
Therefore, it is possible to examine induced innovations in a constrained
maximization framework in which elected representatives respond to com
munity preferences for public and private expenditures. It is assumed
that local representatives seek to maximize the community welfare
function:
(1) U ,= UCE. NT, X)
subject to the local government budget constraint
(2) E + C = T + CY-T)
where E is dollar expenditures on local public goods,
NT is nontax dollar spending on local public goods,
C is dollar expenditures on all other goods,
T is own-source local revenue, and
y is income of local residents.
The community is also limited by a balanced budget constraint where E - T.
VThen tax revenues or income levels are reduced, counties can increase
their utility by using nontax means of service provision.
A linear relationship is assumed for the ith county between the
utility of adopting institutional innovation (t) and the characteristics
of the ith county:
"it " Vt ®it'
Counties are assumed to choose new methods of services delivery .if they can
achieve a higher level of utility by doing so. The ith county will adopt
an innovation if U^2 ^ ^±i' innovation, they
are able to initiate any number of agreement which is a tobit ltype
specification', - "If we'define a variable,to be anLobserved indicator
of a county* s "use of institutional innovations ,-"we can write the enqsirical
approximation of (3) as: '
(4) y.^-=
as:
XiP > if X^P + > 0
0 "• • if X^P + •• •
where is a vector of independent variables, ^ is a vector.of
parameters, and"the disturbances,.e^^ are truncated normal variables.
The maximum likelihood approach suggested by Amemiya is. used to estimate
the "parameters pand o (Amemiya).' 'Since we are concerned with counties
utilizing innovations, the problem is to estimate an equation in which"
the dependent variable is truncated from below. The density function
for number of. innovations adopted, given that the number, of innovations
is positive, is' obtained by dividing the normal density function by the
probability that the number of innovations implemented is positive.
Therefore, the likelihood function based-on the model in (A) is given
M, f '(e./^o)/a
(5) L = (y I y > 0;P.a) = n
i«l 1 - ,F. (0^)
where f and F are the standard normal density and distribution function
and 0^ =—g(x^,p)/a. Parameter estimates can be obtained by maximizing
this likelihood function with respect.to p and o. Amemiya has shown
that:the maximum likelihpod estimator is consistent and asyii^totically
normal and efficient for the case where is linear in the
parameters (Amemiya).
Hypotheses and Empirical Methods
Iowa is used as a case istudy of local government institutional
innovation. Iowa is an appropriate choice for study because the economic
base of the state is rather homogenous and dependent upon an agricultural
base. The financial stress in the agriculture and rural private sector
economic base, in turn, may create fiscal stress conditions which induce
local government units to .develop institutional innovations.
As a result, the empirical specification of the theoretical model
is used to analyze previous Iowa county government decisions regarding
adoption of institutional innovations (nontax methods of providing
public services)• The Iowa Code provides that local units of government,
may develop agreements with other government units and/or private
agencies. These 28E agreements allow internal restructuring, functional
consolidation and/or privatization, as. well as, contracting for services,
joint venturing, functional mergers, and development of multi-county
agencies. >
. The Iowa Code requires that all 28E agreements be registered with
the Secretary of State.. Therefore, a county was defined to exhibit insti
tutional innovation if it registered a 28E agreement with the Secretary of
State's office. Furthermore, the number of 28E agreements registered
between I98A and 1985 was used as an indicator of the institutional
innovations for each county. We believe that these years were appropriate
due to the lag between local government fiscal stress and the financial
conditions in agriculture and the rural economy during the early 1980s.
We may infer from related research (Orazem, Otto, and Edelman) that
community.preferences bri.institutional innovations are likely to be
related to-financial status'indicators, technical community size
indicators, and indicators of access to human capital-resources.- .First,
it may be,h3rpothesized that communities with-greater financial stress
would be more inclined to seek .institutional innovations. Second, larger
communities are'.more likely.to develop institutional -innovations because
of economies .ofisize and'specialization of city functions. Third,
institutional innovations are likely to be greater in communities with
greater access to human capital resources. As a resultj'.the institutional
innovations framework would be supported by this study if the analysis of
observed institutional^innovations are en5>irically related to measures of
financial stress, .communityi.size and human capital variables. • v.
Five .variables .were .used as.indicators of county government financial
status (Table 1) .>I The-percentage of agricultural land..in the county tax
base .(AGLPCT)' is used as an- indicator of potential fiscal stress and,was
hj^othesized to be positively related to institutional innovations. .Per
capita income (INCOME) is inversely 'correlated with fiscal stress and
therefore, was'expected to be negatively related to.institutional
innovations. Change in farmland values (LVALCH) is used as an indicator
of change in the county tax base and was h3T>othesized to be negatively
related to institutional innovations. Fiscal effort (TAXBUR)j was e3q)ected
to be positively related to institutional innovations. :Finally, the
co\mty taxable valuation (TAXVAL) is inversely .related to fiscal stress
and would therefore be•h5^othesized to be negatively related to •
institutional innovations.
Two variables used as indicators of conmninity size» population
(POPUL) and county revenues from all sources (LREV) were hj^othesized to
be positively related to institutional innovations. As community size
increases, we e^^ected lower relative costs for institutional
innovations, as well as, greater economies of size and specialization —
which suggests greater returns to innovation.
Only one variable was used as a proxy for access to human capital.
Here, presence of a college or university (COMCOL) in the county was
h3rpothesized to be positively related to institutional innovation.
The data for estimating the independent variables of the model were
collected from various Departments of state government. The Iowa Office
of the Secretary of State provided primary data on 28E agreements.
Using the above specification of institutiona.1 innovations, 85 percent
of the 99 counties in Iowa exhibited 28E agreements. Since more than
one 28E agreement can be initiated by each county, a Tobit model is
deemed appropriate for a,nalyzing the presence of multiple institutional
innovations per county.
En^irical Results
Maximum likelihood estimates of the Tobit model are presented in
Table 2. The ordinary least squares results, Tobit estimates and
elasticities are presented for comparison. The Tobit results were
estimated using SHAZAM.
The results are generally consistent with e:q}ectations. Although
three variables are nonsignificant, the signs on all of the remaining
significant variables are consistent with the hypothesized signs.
Three-of the .five indicators of county financial status LVALCH,
Income, and TAXBUR were not'significant in explaining institutional
innovation. ' However , the coefficient: for TAXVAL, was significant and
provided-the highest T-ratio and'elasticity,.cp^ared to all other- ,
variables.' The-sign for TAXVAL indicates .thajt-as" county property tax .
valuation declines, ceteris paribus',institutional irinovation increases.
At the sample .mean'^ values for. the :variables, .the elasticity-for TAXV^
indicates that a•1 percent decline in taxable valuation -would be
associated with 3%07 percent^ increase in institutional innovation •
agreements.
The sign for AGLPCT .indicates:that.as the, percentage of agricultural
land in'county, tax base increases, .ice,teris,'paribus , institutional
innovation increases. This is, consistent with^the Jiypothesized -,
relationship.^
Although the coefficient on.iancome per capita and land value change
were not significant,-.they do have the hypothesized signs. The sign for
tax effort was inconsistent with our hypotheses, the coefficient was not
significant.' i
Both county size indicators (POPUL.and LREV) were significant. POPUL
exhibits the second.highest T-ratio .and elasticity compared to. the other
variables.: Evaluated at^the. sample means, the elasticity implies that a
1 percent-increase ,in.population'is associated with, a, 2.^5 percent
increase in'institutional-innovation-,.-agreements.
• The sign on LREV is positive in contrast to the negative^sign for
the-previously.'discussed TAXVAL variable. Local revenue (LREV) includes
intergovernmental revenues .in addition to revenues from own sources. That
is why TAXVAL is included as a measure of financial ^status, while LREV is
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included as a measure of county size. As a result, it is logical to
e3q>ect opposite signs for these two variables.
Finally, as ejected, the ^roxy indicator for the level of human
capital, COMCOL, was positively-related to institutional irmovation..
Since awareness of'institutional -innovations is deemed an important part
of the institutional innovation adoption process, it is logical to
presume that the presence of a college or university would be an
appropriate proxy which indicates a more open innovation and learning•
environment as Well as access to knowledge of. innovations and outreach
programs on this subject.
Conclusions and Implications
In general the theoretical model developed to analyze institutional
innovation behavior of local government units is supported by the
empirical indicators of fiscal status, size, and human capital. All
signs, except one, were consistent with the hypotheses and their
coefficients were insignficiant; Five of the eight variables were
significant .•
County population and total property tax valuation appear to
dominate the other variables. These results imply that institutional
innovations would seem to be associated with more highly populated
counties with relatively lower property tax valuations. In contrast,
more sparsely populated counties with'relatively larger property tax
valuations would be less inclined to adopt institutional innovations.
In addition, it would appear that innovation may be associated with
presence of a university or college, larger proportions- of.-agricultural
land valuation in the property tax base, and presence of higher total
local revenues to implement change.
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Finally, it may appear that sparsely populated rural counties,
without a college or university, with less productive agricultural land,
and with less intergovernmental aid perhaps symbolize the government units
which are perhaps the- least likely to pursue institutional innovations.
Yet these are perhaps the most likely candidates for mandatory
consolidation which is currently being debated..
Within the axioms of the induced innovations model it appears that
the political costs of lost autonomy and shared resources exceed the
benefits or cost savings of a cooperative agreement for .local "political
entrepreneurs'* in the more'rural counties. This result in^J.lies that other
local governmental. reorganization issues in sparsely populated areas may
be difficult to resolve without stronger incentives or more direct
government" involvement and information.
The results also imply that studies of local restructuring options
.1
and programs designed to provide outside-technical assistance may be
required to induce institutional innovation for-public services in many
of these rural areas.• Perhaps there is a role for institutions like the
Extension Service in providing"technical assistance and facilitating this
study process because the targeted audience represents Extension's
traditional clientele.
Finally, a distinction isimade between mandatory studies to e^lore
the institutional innovation options and'mandatory restructuring. The
first concept of induced innovation accepts some measure of local govern
ment self-determination. However, the second approach presumes that a
higher level of government would impose structural change. In accordance
with the induced innovational-model first discussed, the-latter approach
to institutional innovation is likely to occur only at a high political
cost.
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Table 1. Mean, Standard Deviation, and Definition of Variables Used.
Standard ;
Mean Deviation Definition
28EAG
AGLPCT
INCOME
LVALCH
TAXBUR
TAXVAL
POPUL
LREV
COMCOL
4.58 . 10.5
.412 .151
11.741
-.633
.028
• 720,5
28.796
7.412
.777
1.173
-.016
.008
801.7
41.0
7.454
.417
Number of 28E ^.agreements in county during
1984-86
Percentage of county tax base in
agricultural land
Per capita income in.each county ($1,000)
Change in farmland values, 1980-86
CSl.OOO)
Per capita tax revenue as a percent of per
capita personal income
"County taxable valuation ($ million)
Population in each county (1,000)
County tax revenues from all sources
($ million)
Presence of 4-year or community college in
county. O=not present, l=T)resent
Table 2. Estimates of Linear and Toblt Probability Models and Elasticities
of 28E Agreement Adoption by Iowa Counties, 1984-86.,
a/ Tobit^/Independent Linear-
Elasticities
Intercept -46.79 -1.72 -5.32 -1.10
—
AGLPCT 15.23 1.72 1.038 2.42 1.47
INCOME • .714 - .87 .059 .416 .64
LVALCH -.418 -1.07 -.037 -.549 -2.21
TAXBUR -69.32 ' -.48 -31.32 -1.23
1
•
00
TAXVAL .-.022 -3.22 -.004 -3.57 -3.07
POPUL ;519 3.26 .092 3.24 2,45
LREV 1.08 1.64 .•245 2.09
1.68
COMCOL 7.25 3.56 1.29 3.50
.92
'a/n«99, r2«.71
b/jj=gg^ log likelihood:286.46
13
REFERENCES
Deaton, Brady J. "New institutional Arrangements for Supplying Local
Public Services Under New Federalism with Special Reference to
Education," AJAE, 65(1983): 112A-30.
Durst, Roil L, and Richard J, Reeder, "Tax Reform Implications for Rural
Communities and Farmers," Rural Development Perspectives.
USDA-ERS, 3(1987)3: 2-6.
Ervin, David E.. David L. Chicoine and Paul D. Nolte. "Use Value
Assessment of Farmland: Inqilications for Fiscal Stability." NCJAE.
8(Jan. 1986)1: 19-28.
Gold, Steven D. "Property Tax Relief Trends in the Midwest: Where It
All (Or Much of It) Began." Chp. 4 in Financing State and Local
Governments in the 1980s, eds, Walzer and Chicoine. Oelgeschlager,
Gunn and Hain Pub. Inc., Cambridge, MA (1981): 61-87.
Harrigan, Kathryn R. Strategic Flexibility. D. C. Heath and Co.,
1985.
Henry, Mark, Mark Drabenstott and Lynn Gibson, "Rural Growth Slows
Down." Rural Development Perspectives. USDA-ERS, 3(1987)3:
25-30.
Iowa Cooperative Extension Service. "Iowa Tax Facts for Financing State
and Local Government." PM-1281, November 1986.
Kansas Agricultural E:q)eriment Station. "Can the Number of People
Served Make a Difference in Cost of Local Government?" Public
Affairs Pamphlet Series, December 197A.
Porter, Michael E. Competitive Strategy. The Free Press, New York,
1980.
Ruttan, Vernon W. "Induced Institutional Change." Induced Innovation,
eds., Binswanger et al., John Hopkins University, Press, 1978.
